Suburbs Un der Siege is a very welcome book. For too long, commentary on the Mount Laurel doctrine, one of the most impor tant social initiatives of our time, has been left in the hands of peo ple like myself who are day-to-day players at the grassroots level, and who therefore inevitably risk commenting with an advocate's bias.2 Charles Haar brings into the conversation not only his wealth 
Of course, I
am now going to co=ent on Professor Haar's book from my perspective as a day-to-day player, and so it is only fair that I su=arize briefly my involvement with this issue. I had no lawyer's role whatsoever in the first and second Mount Laurel cases them selves, but from 1983 onwards, I served as co-counsel to the public-interest plaintiffs in Urban League of Greater New Brunswick, see infra note 27. Urban League was one of the first fully litigated cases under the Mount Laurel II rules and it therefore became the laboratory for distillin g into workable form many of the bold but untested remedies that had been author- [Vol. 96:1685 of experience and formidable analytic skill, but also his fresh per spective. He renewed my faith in what I have been doing for the past two decades. There was an unmistakable goodness about the best of the 1960s commitment to social reform through law, and that goodness pervades Suburbs Un der Siege. If Professor Haar's vision sometimes exceeds his grasp, then as now, his unshakable conviction that humankind is perfectible and that lawsuits can lead the way reminds me of why I decided to become a public-interest lawyer in the first place. The book is about late-century land-use law, but it should be read by anyone who wishes to understand the heart and soul of postwar legal liberalism.
Despite my enthusiasm for Suburbs Un der Siege, however, I have two fundamental disagreements with Professor Haar's ap proach to the Mount Laurel saga. Our differences are important, because the Mount Laurel doctrine has not traveled well beyond New Jersey, and it is important to understand why.3 He and I are in complete agreement that there is a legitimate role for courts in breaking the political stalemate that has brought us exclusionary zoning, racial discrimination, and an unacceptable degree of social distress in sheltering our people. But our different takes on the Mount Laurel cases may explain why those cases have not sparked a land-use revolution. Specifically, it is my view that Professor Haar overvalues the importance of co-opting the private sector as a key element in the success of the Mount Laurel process. I also be lieve that he overstates the case for the legitimacy of the New Jersey Supreme Court's intervention into land-use policymaking by not inquiring closely enough into the precise nature of the constitu tional violation at hand and the possibility of different paths to the goal of land-use equity.
THE MOUNT LAUREL STORY
In all likelihood, the reader whose attention has been drawn to Suburbs Un der Siege is already familiar with the New Jersey ized in principle by the New Jersey Supreme Court. In January 1986, I argued (unsuccess· fully) the Urban League portion of the so-called Mount Laurel Ill case, described infra note 13 and accompanying text, before the supreme court, and in 1993 I represented the New Jersey affili ate of the ACLU amicus curiae in the Wa rren To wnship case, described infra text accompanying note 53. I was during this same period a founding member and President of the Alliance for Affordable Housing, a coalition of public-interest groups that successfully coordinated opposition to a proposed constitutional amendment that would (as its propo nents urged on their bumper stickers) "Undo Mount Laurel 1\vo." The Alliance also con· ducted the first major study of Mount Laurel compliance, see infra note 21. At present, I am representing a statewide advocacy organization, New Jersey Future, in as yet unpublished litigation against the Council on Affordable Housing that challenges approval of an inclu sionary development on the basis that it violates the "sound planning" language in the sec· ond Mount Laurel case, see 456 A.2d at 430-31.
3. It has been expressly followed, and then only in a limited way, in New Hampshire. See Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991). Supreme Court's bold experiment in law reform, the Mount Laurel doctrine, and it is not my intention to retell the story here under the guise of reviewing the book. Nor, in all frankness; would I send the reader to Professor Haar's account solely for the purpose of acquir ing the narrative details of the events in question; while his telling of the tale is serviceable, his real interest in telling it -and mine in his telling -is so that he can then use the story as a case study in judicial activism.4
Th e Mount Laurel Litigation
Let this skeletal summary suffice, then. In 1971,5 a team of young legal services lawyers in Camden, New Jersey came to the aid of black residents of Mount Laurel Township, a once-rural commu nity that was rapidly developing as a bedroom suburb of Philadelphia. Their goal was to break the municipality's exclusion ary land use system, which consisted of zoning laws and habitability codes operating in tandem to force demolition of the poor, run down housing that was all the plaintiff s could afford -a chicken coop in one notorious example -and to preclude the construction of modest new homes and subsidized public housing that could have given them safe, sanitary, and affordable alternatives. When the case reached the New Jersey Supreme Court, it was welcomed by Justice Frederick Hall, who had been campaigning within the court for years to reform its excessive. deference to municipal au tonomy in land-use matters.6 Justice Hall's opinion gave voice to what is now known as the Mount Laurel doctrine:
We conclude that every such [developing] municipality must, by its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an ap propriate variety and choice of housing .... at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional need therefor.7
4. For an exhilarating recounting of the Mount Laurel story that fills in the bare outlines I have sketched here, the reader will want to seek out DAVID L. Kiru> ET AL., OuR ToWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995). 6. Justice Hall's dissent in Vickers v. Gloucester To wnship, 181 A.2d 129, 140, 145 (N.J. 1962) (Hall, J., dissenting) , is commonly regarded as .the opening judicial salvo in the cam paign that eventually resulted in the Mount Laurel doctrine.
7. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724. The "regional fair share" obligation of Mount Laurel I was originally interpreted to apply only to "developing" municipalities such as Mount Lau rel Township. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 422-23. This interpretation was modified in Mount Laurel II to apply to all municipalities throughout the state, insofar as they had "in digenous" housing need. Municipalities that encompassed land that was identified on state plans as appropriate for "growth" had further "fair share" obligations beyond their indige nous need. See 456 A.2d at 430. [Vol. 96:1685 This first Mount Laurel opinion prompted furious political opposi tion, municipal intransigence, and a flood of lawsuits, but very little actual progress toward breaking the back, of exclusionary zoning. Then, in 1983, under the vigorous leadership of new chief justice Robert Wilentz, the court issued a second major decision, Mount Laurel II, 8 in which it reaffirmed the holding of the first Mount Laurel case and outlined a sweeping set of remedial steps designed to ensure that municipalities obeyed their obligations under the New Jersey Constitution. Three specially assigned trial judges were given responsibility for all Mount Laurel-related litigation through out the state. They were told to develop a formula that would as sign specific numerical "fair share" obligations to individual municipalities, and they were authorized to grant "builder's reme dies" to plaintiff s who successfully demonstrated that a municipal ity's land use ordinances were exclusionary. Pursuant to a "builder's remedy," the successful developer-litigant could bypass the local zoning and win a court order permitting its project to be built, so long as the builder proposed an "inclusionary develop ment" -that is, one in which at least twenty percent of the units were made affordable to low-and moderate-income households.9
Th e Legislative Response When the Mount Laurel trial judges began implementing their Mount Laurel II powers vigorously in 1984 and 1985, the legislature finally responded, as the court had been urging it to do since 1975. It enacted the Fair Housing Act of 1985,1 0 arguably the most pro gressive piece of state housing legislation anywhere in the country. The Act's centerpiece was a new agency, the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH), which was authorized to take over from the courts the task of calculating housing obligations and certifying compliance plans for any municipality that voluntarily submitted to the Council's jurisdiction. The bait for doing so was that "substan tively certified" municipalities were effectively immunized from Mount Laurel litigation.11 The Act also authorized municipalities to transfer up to fifty percent of their fair share obligations to other municipalities pursuant to so-called Regional Contribution Agree ments (RCAs), so long as the "sending" municipality also :financed the housing activity in the "receiving" municipality.12 In practice, this permitted a reallocation of fair share housing obligationsand the low-income housing itself -from all-White middle-class suburbs to·poorer and non-White urban centers.
·
In 1986, in Hills Development Co. v. To wnship of Bernards, 13 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, even while acknowledging that in some respects it diluted the meth ods of compliance that had been developed judicially. Since then, the supreme court has largely withdrawn from the field. It has tinkered at the edges, generally in ways that are helpful to the pro ponents of housing equity,14 but has not revisited first principles, as it did in Mo unt Laurel IL The process remains controversial, but not at the white-heat level of a decade ago -when the governor could score political points by denouncing Mount Laurel II as "communistic."15 The Council on Affordable Housing has bent over backward to accommodate municipal interests and concerns, and while housing advocates have decried the slow pace of pro gress, they have lacked the political power to control the process to the extent that they did in the courts.
In recounting all of this, Suburbs Un der Siege takes an under stated approach, but Professor Haar leaves no doubt about his ad miration for the Mount Laurel doctrine and the judges that produced it. He has a deft way of capturing points of the story in a phrase that is just right; he describes the odious RCAs, for example, as a "safety valve" (p. 114), the kind of messy compromise that poli ticians regularly craft and that judges must learn to accept if they are to infiltrate the politician's turf in law reform cases. His charac terization of the internal division between "the infantry of the trial courts and the strategic headquarters of the supreme court" (p. 32) puts into clear perspective a problem that bedeviled administration of the first Mount Laurel opinion. Cases under the Mount Laurel doctrine prior to 1983 were so numerous, so complex, and so never-13. 510 A.2d 621 {NJ. 1986). Hills is often erroneously referred to as Mount Laurel Ill, though Mount Laurel township was then no longer a party to any exclusionary zoning litigation.
14. In addition to the two major cases discussed later in the text, Holmdel Builders Assn. v. To wnship of Holmdel, 583 A2d 277 (NJ. 1990) (upholding municipal authority to levy development impact fees to support Mount Laurel compliance) and In re Wa rren To wnship, 622 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1993) (limiting residency preferences in compliance plans), see, e.g., Prowitz v. Ridgefield Park Village, 584 A.2d 782 (N.J. 1991) (Mount Laurel units to be as sessed for property tax purposes at controlled, rather than market, price). For a less helpful, although arguably correct, decision, see Alexander's Department Stores, Inc. v. Borough of Paramus, 592 A.2d 1168 (N.J. 1991) (COAH does not have ancillary jurisdiction to resolve conventional zoning disputes that derive from a municipality's certified fair share plan).
15. See K:!RP ET AL., supra note 4, at 121. The authors attribute the quote to an interview in the New Yo rk Times but do not provide a citation. For one version of the remark, see Robert Hanley, Some Je rsey To wns, Giving in to Courts, Let in Modest Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1984 , at Al, reporting that Governor Kean, in an interview, described forced eco nomic mixing as "a 'communist' concept." ending that the lower courts at times all but subverted Justice Hall's mandate in order to make them go away. This explains why the second Mount Laurel decision concentrated all implementing power in three specially assigned trial judges, who would have pri mary loyalty to the Mount Laurel opinion and the process it man dated, without any other docket pressures. He also points out, with just the right touch of irony, that a success of the Mount Laurel doctrine was to force the breakdown of stereotypes about poverty and race in the sensitive area of land use, where an instinctive de fense of home can blind otherwise fair-minded people to the cal lousness of their attitudes: "Whenever a town absorbs new low and moderate-income housing and the sky does not come tumbling down, other communities will be that much more likely to take the leap themselves" (p. 191).
Un derstanding the Mount Laurel Story
But I do not mean to suggest that the success of Suburbs Un der Siege is solely one of style, although the readable text and well paced eloquence are certainly welcome. Professor Haar also offers a number of thoughtful insights into the Mount Laurel process it self. He notes, correctly, that Mount Laurel II does little to expli cate the moral and ethical basis of the doctrine, a crucial judicial mistake attributable, at least in part, to "hubris" on the part of the chief justice (p. 48). He then continues with this summary passage, which reveals the central problem of politics and judicial legitimacy:
With the wisdom born of the litigation that followed Mount Laurel II, it is clear that the court should have fo cused more intensely on edu cating the public .... Mount Laurel II appears unwilling to stoop to the concerns and queries of the average citizen. Indeed, the most re sounding chord in the opinion is not the court's desire to explain the necessity for, or the limited or temporary nature of, the judicial inter vention, but a determination to put steel into its Mount Laurel Doc trine. [p. 50] Other useful insights abound. Haar correctly notes that New Jersey's Fair Housing Act and the ensuing COAH regulations codi fied the core, although not always the details, of the Mount Laurel doctrine (p. 71) -a view quite unlike the more conventional view of the Act, and of the Hills decision sustaining the Act, as a "sellout." He points out that there is a strong parallel between the role of the court-appointed "expert" or master in Mount Laurel cases and the conventional role of a planner in advising govern ments as they make land-use decisions,16 although he does not pur sue the implications of this by also pointing out that the more the court's work looks like conventional planning activity, the more it appears to the average citizen to be encroaching on political terrain. Haar provides a good, balanced summ ary and critique of the Fair Housing Act and the Hills decision, in which he largely avoids the winners-losers trap 1 7 -if the municipalities won, then the good guys must have lost. Haar also gets the Holmdel decision right, pointing out that by essentially writing into the Act an authoriza tion for development fees to subsidize lower-income housing that nowhere appears explicitly in the legislative text, the decision con tinues and reaffirms the court's pre-Fair Housing Act pattern of making policy . The "Builder's Remedy "
Commentators have generally applauded the court's endorse ment of the builder's remedy, and with some justification; co-opting the private housing market in an era of declining public subsidies for low-_ and moderate-income housing produced results in the early years after Mount Laurel II that would have been otherwise unob tainable.21 But Professor Haar warns us that these results came at a price -"the builder's remedy narrowed the scope of latent solu tions, and once unleashed, it was potentially powerful enough to distort the impact of the Mount Laurel Doctrine" (p. 45). He is certainly right about that. As I have explained elsewhere, the abil ity to provide land to build "inclusionary developments" in satisfac tion of the builder's remedy became the be-all and end-all of the compliance process, so much so that inclusionary zoning is now welded permanently into the fair share rules of the Council on Af fordable Housing.22 Through a "vacant land adjustment"23 and a fair-share calculation based on the concept of the "reasonable de velopment potential"24 of the municipality, the COAR rules essen tially exclude Mount Laurel compliance where large, new inclusionary developments are not feasible, such as in most of the older, built-up parts of the state. This is certainly, in Professor Haar's language, a "distortion" of the intent of Mount Laurel II (p.
45).
Haar also recognizes the broader implications of the reliance on private sector builder-plaintiffs:
[I]t became clearer, as lawsuits accumulated, that the builders were in there for their own profit, and that this was not an unalloyed good. Adam Smith (or perhaps Hobbes) was proven right again. Most builders were ready to make any kind of agreement with a municipal ity -even where the outcome fed the exclusionary quality of the 19. The quotation in the text is a paraphrase. Not surprisingly for a remark so flamboy ant, it can be found in KIRP ET AL., supra note 4, at 105, rather than Suburbs Un der Siege.
20. See Alan Mallach, Th e To rtured Reality of Suburban Exclusion: Zoning, Economics, and the Future of the Berenson Doctrine, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 37, 119 (1986 zoning ordinance -as long as they obtained the zoning changes that would enhance their own profit .... "I had less uneasiness about the whole litigation process }Vhen a public interest group was the plaintiff, rather than a builder. Therefore I felt less of a need for the court appointed master in the public interest cases," explained one of the Mount Laurel judges. [pp. 63-64] Professor Haar quickly puts this trenchant criticism aside, how ever. He describes the builder's remedy at one point as "the grand strategy for achieving social reform without dependence on the political actors within the executive and administrative branches who might have resisted the Mount Laurel Doctrine or imple mented it in a hostile spirit."25 Results count, in other words; the end justifies the means. He was right in his initial skepticism, how ever. There were other "latent solutions" to the problem of provid ing lower-income housing in the suburbs, and he not only misses an opportunity to explore why they remained "latent," he falls into what I regard as the most serious error in his overall telling of the Mount Laurel story. To understand why this is so, I need to drop back for a moment and introduce a specific example.26
Private Remedies. in Action: Cranbury To wnship 26. I note here in passing that Suburbs Un der Siege does not dig into the storytelling of post-1983 events with the same thoroughness that it applies to telling the story of Mount Laurel Township. By the time of the Hills decision in 1986, Mount Laurel Township had settled its litigation and was no longer a significant player in the Mount Laurel story, and this leaves the storytelling without a focus. As a result, Professor Haar's discussion of the conse quences of Mount Laurel II through implementation, legislation, and finally administrative procedures lacks the strong anchor in practical reality that informs the earlier part of the book. Much more attention needs to be given to the day-to-day implementation of the doc trine in the cases that became prominent after 1983. These cases can be told as stories, just as the Mount Laurel Township story is told, so that they are not known only from the slender evidence of the published judicial decisions. The lack of a strong, specific storytelling focus may be what leads Professor Haar astray in his enthusiasm for the market solution to the Mount Laurel problem, as I shall try to show by telling a bit more of the post-1983 Mount Laurel story. Greater New Brunswick -it later changed its name to the Civic League of Greater New Brunswick -at the time of the remand and participated extensively in the subsequent pro ceedings. Documentation is available in the author's voluminous but unpublished litigation files in the case, which are available at Rutgers Law School for inspection by interested readers.
[Vol. 96:1685 of 1970. Although Cranbury's land-use ordinances were hopelessly exclusionary -at least as Justice Hall would have understood the term -the town had better reasons to regret growth than did Mount Laurel. A small farming village surrounded by actively worked fields, its Main Street and adjacent residential district, dat ing from the tum of the nineteenth century, were listed on the Na tional Register of Historic Places. "Preserving" Cranbury was an instantly marketable idea, the value of which could be understood readily by the average citizen of goodwill. Unfortunately for Cranbury, however, holding back time was not really an option: it was served by an adjacent exit on the New Jersey Turnpike, it was five miles or so due east of the burgeoning Route One Corridor area of office and research parks centered on Princeton University, and its elegant older homes made it a favorite for upper-level bu reaucrats and private-sector lobbyists working in Trenton, the state capital, just a few miles to the south. Nor did Cranbury Township totally resist change, so long as it was in the form of tax-paying commercial development or upscale, large-lot subdivisions. Cranbury was, in short, an exclusionary community whose land-use ordinances stood in violation of the New Jersey Constitution, but in remedying that wrong there was a significant risk that the courts would do more harm than good by creating yet another example of a nice community ruined by sprawl development.
Prior to the decision in Mount Laurel II, Cranbury Township was in litigation on two fronts, against the Urban League plaintiffs -a public-interest group acting directly on behalf of lower-income people -and against a private builder's-remedy plaintiff whose principals included Carl Bisgaier, the lawyer who had brought the original Mount Laurel suit in 1970. Bisgaier and his colleagues, who remained committed to the social goals of the Mount Laurel doctrine, �ere out to prove that those goals could be combined with profitmaking in what might be seen as a form of socially responsible capitalism. Cranbury fought both plaintiffs fiercely.
After Mount Laurel II, however, it did not require rocket sci ence to realize the profit potential of a builder's remedy. Cranbury, with its historic district, sylvan fields, and access to high-end em ployment, became a magnet for Mount Laurel lawsuits. Within a few months of the Mount Laurel II decision, eight additional devel opers sued Cranbury, offering a total of more than three thousand acres for development. The Urban League plaintiffs did not disagree that this amount of development was much more than a small community could real istically absorb over a short period of time, nor did they disagree that this amount of development would present potentially serious planning problems -including the destruction of valuable farm land. Had the Urban League been in the lawsuit by itself, these concerns would have been addressed with a view not only to build ing affordable housing but to the larger public interest as well. Each proffered site, and perhaps others, would have been examined by the plaintiff's experts for compliance purposes. But because none of the landowners or developers would have had a preemptive builder's-remedy claim in this alternative scenario, any one site could have been passed over had the Urban League and Cranbury chosen to do so in proposing a settlement to the court. Indeed, the Urban League would have been free 'to· discuss with the township alternate ways of encouraging low-and moderate-income housing that did not involve inclusionary zoning at all.
This is exactly what happened in the neighboring township, Plainsboro, where for idiosyncratic reasons, the Urban League liti gated by itself, without a single builder's-remedy claimant.32 Plains boro informed the Urban League that it would settle quickly to reduce litigation costs, so long as it could settle without a major infusion of new inclusionary developments. The town had grown rapidly from an agricultural village to a sprawl of garden apart ments during the 1970s, and it had learned its planning lesson, even if a bit belatedly. An innovative settlement was concluded in due course that involved only 200 units in an inclusionary development -forty of which were for Mount Laurel households. The remain der of Plainsboro's fair share was to be met partly in a subsidized development consisting of 413 Mount Laurel rental units with no market rate units, and partly by taking development fees from new commercial developments in the Route One corridor and applying the money to buy down the cost of 120 rental units already in place Vol. 96:1685 from the earlier phases of Plainsboro's growth -a kind of home grown housing voucher program.33
In Cranbury, however, the builder-plaintiff sites drove out all strategies other than inclusionary zoning. No one could stop the builder plaintiffs from suing, and once they did, the supreme court had decreed, in effect, that at least one of them had valuable "rights." Worse, the glut of would-be builder's-remedy claimants made it impossible for the Urban League and any single builder plaintiff to settle with the township, because the losers were virtu ally guaranteed to challenge the settlement in court, eliminating any time-and-money incentive to settle in the first place. The Urban League had no choice but to sit by in frustration while the feeding frenzy proceeded apace, knowing that the defendant municipality was also sitting by, not in frustration, but in the enviable position of being able to avoid serious talk about settling a case that it could not win on the merits, hoping that the various plaintiffs would even tually exhaust themselves. In the end, it was not exhaustion but passage of time that mattered most, and Cranbury eventually did emerge as the winner. Cranbury was still in the midst of the court supervised remedial process -violation of the Mount Laurel doc trine had already been determined by Judge Serpentelli -when the Fair Housing Act and the Hill s decision transferred the whole mess to COAH.34 COAH reduced the township's fair share number from 816 to 153, and most of the builder plaintiffs got noth ing -including the Bisgaier group, which had borne the expense of litigation for years and which sold its site for development of expen sive single-family homes on large lots when it became clear that it could not prevail with its inclusionary plan.35 Apr. 22, 1985) . This settle ment later collapsed because the key subsidy for the 100% Mount Laurel development, tax sheltered depreciation write-offs, was eliminated by Congress in the Ta x Reform Act of 1986. See Tr acy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: Th e Low-Income Ho using Credit, 38 V1LL. L. REv. 871, 883 nn. 62-64 (1993) . But the principle behind the settlement remains sound: without a clutter of builder plaintiffs, a broader range of strategies can be considered seriously. The Plainsboro settlement could be roughly replicated today using the Low Income Housing Tax Credits that Congress eventually provided to replace the tradi tional tax-sheltering schemes. See id.
34. See Hills Dev. Aug. 24, 1987 . The plan included an RCA transfer of 76 units to Perth Amboy, New Jersey, an old and poor port town at the mouth of the Raritan River; rehabilitation of 10 units of substandard existing housing; and two developments totaling 58 units. One was a senior citizen development, 100% low and moderate units, tucked in behind the historic Main Street shops and houses, adjacent to the public school and athletic field, and barely encroaching on the farm fields that stretched west from the village. The other was an inclu sionary development of large, single-family homes on large lots, also sited as an extension of the existing village, and in this instance moving toward the highways that had already obliter ated the rural character of the village in that direction. Most significant, the inclusionary -The Urban League plaintiffs did try at one point to unclog the Cranbury litigation by supporting the township in a motion to strike the largest builder's remedy claimant on the ground that the devel oper, Lawrence Zirinsky, had used Mount Laurel as a "threat" to obtain other favorable, non-Mount Laurel development approvals before intervening as a Mount Laurel plaintiff. Professor Haar speaks favorably of the "threat" language in Mount Laurel II as a "further hedge[ ] about a remedy so powerful" (p. 45), but he does not connect it to the Cranbury experience. If he had, he might not have been so approving. To the astonishment of the other builder plaintiffs, who thought that a public-interest party would, by defini tion, support them uncritically since they were offering to build lower-income housing, the Urban League argued that the court should define the "threat" exception to eliminate plaintiffs who did not come to the court "clean" -that is, whose first offer to the town was not for Mount Laurel housing. Unless the court adopted such a rule, the Urban League argued, the exact kind of tangle that was strangling the Cranbury litigation would result. Judge Serpentelli, perhaps understanding the supreme court's preference for private litigants better than the Urban League did, denied the motion. The "hedge," in other words, was flimsy and has not, so far as I am aware, had any significant use in the years since Mount Laurel IL
The Limits of Privatization
As for Professor Haar, there is no guessing ab out his admiration for the use of private litigants as the primary moving force in the Mount Laurel story, and this is the least successful theme of Sub urbs Un der Siege. Although Haar makes a gesture toward the public-interest bar by describing the "unusual combination of ener gies" that resulted when both public and private parties were bring ing cases, he proceeds immediately to praise "[t]he rare coincidence of private-and public-sector interests [that] testifies to the ingenu ity of Mount Laurel II in harnessing the expertise and profit drive of the private sector -the developer -in order to achieve a pub lic end" (p. 63). It is the private sector, in other words, that he sees as essential to making the Mount'Laurel doctrine a success. Nor is it simply that he sees the private sector as a useful addition to the mix; he appears to be deeply skeptical about the capacity of the public-interest bar to sustain this type of litigation. Thus, in a pasMo unt Laurel -units in this latter project are four-family units fitted into structures that have the scale and massing of the adjacent single-family homes, so that they do not appear incongruous in context. Except for the RCA and the smaller fair share, Cranbury's compli ance plan easily could have been accepted by the Urban League plaintiff s in 1984. But the ha=erlock of the builder's remedy made that kind of negotiation impossible.
[Vol. 96:1685 sage soon after the words quoted above, he criticizes public-interest plaintiffs for delaying compliance in one unnamed case for six years because "they were not ... equipped to monitor the development process" (p. 64). He is certainly correct that compliance dragged on for years in many cases, but it did so for a variety of reasonsincluding municipal creativity in finding ways to slow the processand these problems were not confined to the public interest cases.36 Moreover, as the Cranbury experience demonstrates, the "unusual combination of energies" that Professor Haar applauds at least nominally -the mix of public-interest and developer plaintiffshas at least as much potential for slowing down the process as it does for benefiting from the enforcement capacity of the private sector.
Professor Haar's enthusiasm for private remedies leads him to several debatable conclusions. He is much too generous, for exam ple, in appraising the work of COAR. I doubt that there is any public-interest housing advocate in the state of New Jersey who would agree with him that COAR has adopted an "aggressive pos ture in pursuing the Mount Laurel doctrine" (p. 104). As Professor Haar recognizes and describes accurately elsewhere in his book (pp. 92-93), the Fair Housing Act was adopted only grudgingly by a leg islature in a political bind: home rule notwithstanding, it had to do something to get the courts off the back of outraged municipalities. COAR was set up to dissipate constitutional pressure, not to fur ther expand constitutional confrontation by pursuing aggressive new policies. As I have explained, however,37 COAR incorporated into its rules a single-minded focus on measuring compliance through large-scale inclusionary developments constructed by pri vate developers, and this is apparently what Professor Haar sees as COAR's "aggressive" 'stance. Maybe so, but only to the extent that the public's interest in affordable housing coincides with the private interest of large-scale developers. Suburbs Un der Siege does not do . The development could not be built in the housing recession of the late 1970s, and the Urban League, investigating the status of the township's compliance in 1984 after Mount Laurel II, found that the township, whose name had since been changed to Old Bridge, already had approved a market rate "phase" of the Oakwood development, without making any provision for the required Mount Laurel units. Because the normal rule in Mount Laurel development is that the lower-income units must be phased with the market units, to prevent the developer from walking away at the end with the subsi dized units unbuilt, the Urban League had little difficulty persuading Judge Serpentelli that stem measures were in order. But the episode demonstrates that in proving "Adam Smith (or perhaps Hobbes ) ... right again," as Professor Haar puts it {p. 63 ), there is no obvious reason to prefer private to public litigants in Mount Laurel cases.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
much to identify, let along explicate, the inherent tension between these two interests.
Later, in commenting_ on the court's willin gness to uphold the Fair Housing Act, which undercuts some of the remedies developed by the Mount Laurel judges, Professor Haar offers the astonishing comment that "[h]ad there been more visible support from public interest groups, the court might have struggled harder [in Hills] to make the actions of the three trial judges more broadly applicable and to elaborate still further the principles of its doctrine" (p. 98).
What Professor Haar overlooks is that by embracing the builder's remedy, the private-sector remedy, so wholeheartedly, the court, in effect, drove the public-interest bar out of the Mount Laurel area.
Although public-interest litigation often depends heavily on the un paid labors of volunteer attorneys, planning experts, and others, it still is not free; the Urban League litigation was supported by a substantial grant from a New Jersey foundation to pay for deposi tions, travel expenses of witnesses, and so forth. Furthermore, volunteerism has its limits. To be done well, public-interest litiga tion requires paid counsel that can devote adequate time to the case, just as any private-interest litigant would prefer. Thus, it re mains a total mystery to me why the supreme court was so willin g to award private-sector Mount Laurel litigants a substantial finan cial "bonus" in the form of a builder's remedy, while at the same time explicitly denying civil rights attorney's fees to public-interest plaintiff s. 38
The baneful results of this tilt toward privatization include some of those that Professor Haar himself notes, but which he ultimately seems willing to disregard in his admiration for the court's genius in co-opting the private sector. Criticizing the standard 4:1 ratio of market rate to Mount Laurel units as too rigid, he observes that "[a]s time passed, it became clear that the court's formula had not squeezed the developers hard enough" (p. 166). But if the builders are the only parties before the courts, who is to do the squeezing? Certainly not the builders, whose profit margins are at stake. Haar points out that the emphasis on the builder's remedy shrinks the range of possible solutions, which in tum exacerbates the public relations problem that he criticizes the court for not dealing with effectively. Because the builder's remedy gobbles up land -four units of market-rate housing to build each Mount Laurel unitinclusionary zoning is a fat target for anyone who is concerned about overdevelopment and sprawl. This in tum provides a conve- [Vol. 96:1685 nient cover for those whose exclusionary motives are less admira ble. As Haar correctly notes, the Mount Laurel process "may be faulted for failing to stress rental housing" (p. 166). This is of criti cal importance to low-income families, because they often lack the cash reserves and credit history to qualify for even a subsidized home purchase. But this dearth of rental housing results not be cause, as Professor Haar suggests, the trial judges and masters failed to require it; it results because the private sector did not want to build it and would not participate -even for the reward of a builder's remedy -if rental was a condition.39
Moreover, reliance on the private sector causes some of the dis interest among public-interest groups that Professor Haar decries. It is true that many of those whose advocacy is on behalf of the seriously poor have lost interest in the Mount Laurel process, but the overemphasis on the builder's remedy bears a significant share of the blame. The typical builder's willingness to subsidize Mount Laurel units ceases at about the point where a household earns less than forty percent of the regional median income. Even though techniques are available to adjust the mix in an inclusionary devel opment so that families below this income level can be made eligi ble, most developers simply balk. So Mount Laurel is left open to the criticism that it does not serve the interests of the "poorest of the poor," those whose plight makes the most appealing case for changing public policy. The criticism is at least in part justified, but Professor Haar misses an opportunity to explain how the court missed an opportunity to make things better by thinking harder about the role of public-interest agencies in the process.
A Role fo r Public-Interest Plaintiffs
The supreme court got it exactly backward, I would argue, and in applauding the court's approach, so does Professor Haar. Be cause "Adam Smith (or Hobbes)" is alive and well in the spirit of the business community, the court should have recognized that the natural seat of public-interest law reform is in the public-interest community (p. 63). The court should have taken steps to bolster the ability of civil rights organizations, legal services offices, and other civic groups to investigate, sue, and then monitor compliance with Mount Laurel orders, through the simple device of civil rights attorney's fees on the model of federal law.40 In the extreme, one could argue that the builder's remedy, the most celebrated feature 39. Note, for example, that in the Urban League settlement with Plainsboro Township, supra note 33, the public-interest plaintiffs bargained for 413 of 453 new construction units to be rental rather than sales units, by relying on not-for-profit and public sponsorship and avoiding private market developers.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994 ).
of the Mount Laurel doctrine, was unnecessary. All the court needed to do was to endorse the concept of inclusionary zoning. Public-interest plaintiffs then would have looked for appropriate in clusionary sites and cooperated with willin g developers, retaining, along with the courts, some greater measure of discretion to avoid having to approve a development just because a builder had a "remedy."
But a court did not need to go as far as to take this extreme position. Public-interest and builder's-remedy claims could both have been allowed, had the court recognized that the builder's rem edy -the inducement to sue -was unnecessary when there was already a competent public-interest litigant handling the case. In Cranbury, for example, the Urban League plaintiff s had been in the litigation for years; it was ludicrous even to consider rewarding the late-coming builders as if they were the ones responsible for prov ing Cranbury's ordinance unconstitutional.41 Had it retained con trol of the litigation, the Urban League would have considered the various builder sites and proposed the best ones to the town for settlement, and Cranbury likely would have had affordable housing in the ground years earlier than actually occurred.
That the model I am describing would have worked is not just speculation -it did work. Piscataway Township, another township included in the Urban League suit, had experienced rapid growth because of a new interstate highway across its northern edge, and it was therefore suitable for inclusionary zoning solutions. Initially, however, no builder's-remedy plaintiffs were involved in the case because Piscataway, unlike Cranbury, was open to development.
Developers did not need the Hobbesian Mount Laurel wedge to gain access to the community. Instead, the public-interest plaintiffs spent an agonizing period of discovery, poring over township tax maps with their planning expert, and eventually taking three full days of deposition testimony from the township's planner, to iden tify and evaluate every significant piece of vacant, developable land for possible inclusion in the court-ordered compliance plan. Only then did inclusionary developers begin to pay attention, but on the . public-interest plaintiffs' terms -which included genuine concern for sound planning solutions.42 41. Judge Serpentelli did deny some would-be builder's-remedy plaintiffs the right to in tervene, but on the kind of old-fashioned civil procedure ground that Professor Haar decries elsewhere, see p. 137, namely, that the intervention came on the eve of trial and would dis rupt the discovery schedule. If I am critical of Professor Haar's analysis of "public interest" and "market" solutions to the Mount Laurel problem, and I am, it also bears stating that his is the prevailing wisdom and mine the dissenting view. I have dwelt on it here at some length in part be cause Professor Haar's lifelong commitment to sound planning val ues, which ought to have made him skeptical of the builder's remedy, apparently was not enough to overcome the siren song of the quick and tangible results that could be obtained from the court's potentially Faustian bargain with the developers. This tells me that revising the conventional wisdom will not be easy. My con cerns also relate directly to the "legitimacy" and "public relations" themes of his book, to which I now turn, because in my view the popular stereotype of the builder's remedy and, on occasion, the tangible evidence of its misuse -suburban sprawl developmenthave been a very large factor in the inability of the courts and the public interest community to sell the Mount Laurel doctrine as a legitimate exercise of public policy.
ACTIVIST CouRTs: THE Mo oNT LA OR EL PROCESS Suburbs Un der Siege hits its stride at about the midpoint, where Professor Haar shifts his focus from narrative to critique; the heart of his thesis is found in Chapters Te n and Eleven, entitled, respec tively, "Leadership in Institutional Reform: Rallying Support for a Vision," and "The Last Recourse: Why Judges Intervene." The two chapters should be considered in reverse order, however. The "Leadership" chapter, which is very brief, criticizes the New Jersey Supreme Court for not "selling" its Mount Laurel decisions effec tively to the public. But selling the c;iecisions assumes that the jus tices had a legitimate basis for rendering them in the first place, and so "Why Judges Intervene" is really the first and more important question.
A Theory of Ju dicial Activism
Professor Haar's answer is succinct:
The Mount Laurel litigations bring to the fore the residual role of the courts in the checks-and-balances system of a constitutional de mocracy. Local governments, ordinarily endowed with total discre tion in the exercise of zoning power, are found to be seriously and chronically � constitutional default. In such a state of affairs, and engendering the animosity of the township -on whose goodwill the developer inevita bly depends for numerous small matters during the course of development -Hovnanian typically came in after a Mount Laurel suit was finished, acquired the compliance site, and thereafter built what is generally regarded to be a very acceptable affordable housing prod uct. Achieving Mount Laurel goals, in other words, is not dependent so much on the builder's remedy as it is on inclusionary zoning, which public-interest plaintiffs are quite ca pable of negotiating.
whatever a court's adherence to the separation of powers as usually enunciated or whatever the loyalty to the conventional division of powers among the levels of government as typically argued, the strict rules of judicial insulation become inapposite. [p. 175] The "usual," "conventional," or "typical" rules of separation of powers can be set aside, he argues, because it is both "appropriate" and "necessary" to vest in the courts "a residual role" (pp. 175-82). It is appropriate for four reasons: because a constitutional right is at stake (p. 176); because the courts are institutionally disinterested other than in the correct application of the rules of law (p. 176); because courts, unlike legislatures, are capable of acting as trustees for future generations against the "long-term, potentially irrevers ible, and frequently incalculable harms" of present-day political decisionmaking (p. 177); and because it is a peculiar characteristic of the judicial system that it can stimulate "reasoned discourse" about "a more generous vision of the social order" than can the political process (p. 177). It is necessary, in the Mount Laurel cases, because there is no reason to believe that the political system will correct the violation of the constitutional order on its own and be cause the decentralization of political power in state and local gov ernments makes it impossible to bring a regional perspective to land use issues (p. 181).
Some of this framework is essentially unarguable. The dynamic of modem-day politics certainly places a premium on short-term fixes that can pay off before the next election rather than on long term solutions -particularly if they carry short term costs -and land-use decisionmaking is extremely fragmented because of the tradition of deference to local control in this field. Beyond these basic points, however, agreement fades. Even if we can readily ac cept that judges are more likely to keep an eye on the interests of future generations, the future remains essentially unknowable, even to conscientious judges. Thus, it may not be obvious to the present generation that � judicial decision is legitimate simply because it is forward-looking. Nor, in connection with political fragmentation and the abuses of local control, is it correct to identify the state courts as the only institution with a sufficiently broad perspective to correct any perceived abuses. The governor and the state legisla ture have a statewide perspective, even if imperfect. To many peo ple, these political institutions' acceptance of a decentralized land use process reflects the legitimate resolution of the pushes and pulls of a myriad of interest groups. In the abstract, I would agree read ily with Professor Haar that the enlightened New Jersey Supreme Courts of Justice Hall and Chief Justice Wilentz had the capacity to do a better job than the governors and legislatures of those times at reforming the abuses of land-use power -witness Governor Kean's "communistic" crack -but the "best" solution is not neces-sarily the only solution that can claim to be a legitimate one in a complex world. On the factors thus far enumerated, Professor Haar's claims for the legitimacy of structural reform litigation and judicial decisionmaking have a slightly conclusory or makeweight character about them.
Professor Haar's broader claims are also problematic. For ex ample, one has to approach his assertion that courts are "disinter ested" with caution. The disinterestedness of judges has been the classic defense of the legitimacy of judicial review since the time of John Marshall and Marbury v. Madison. 43 But as Professor Haar himself carefully acknowledges, "pressed by the force of events, even the court may become an advocate for a particular position or side" (p. 176). His solution, imposing "curbs" on judges -"both traditional and adjusted for the new situation" -that will "confine too extensive an exercise of discretion" (p. 176; emphasis added), will not do much to persuade the skeptical observer that judges are truly "disinterested," at least without a much more thorough explo ration of what may constitute "too extensive" an exercise of legiti mate judicial power.
Finding the Constitutional Basis fo r Ju dicial Activism
The core of th e problem with Professor Haar's justification for an activist judiciary, at least as revealed through the example of the Mount Laurel cases, lies in his first premise -namely, that there is an unredressed constitutional violation that will remain un redressed unless the court intervenes and acts for the benefit of the victims of such behavior. In principle, he is certainly correct. Our preference for legislative control in a democratic society notwith standing, when the legislature disregards the constitution, as New Jersey's did in the eight years between Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II and even for some years thereafter, Professor Haar is surely right to say that the legislature has forfeited much of its claim to primacy. Judicial action becomes necessary -that is, legitimate -to vindicate the higher mandate of the constitution itself (p. 177). So, too, it is easier to accept a judge's slipping from disinter estedness to advocacy, for present as well as future generations, when such one-sidedness is on behalf of an accepted constitutional principle. Holmes and Brandeis were not disinterested when it came to the First Amendment, but their views are now accepted as legitimate nonetheless.
But is there an accepted constitutional principle that undergirds the vigorous and controversial activism of the Mount Laurel cases? The simple answer, and the one that apparently convinces Professor
Haar that he need go no farther, is that in Mount Laurel I the New Jersey Supreme Court held that there was a constitutional principle that had been violated -the principle of regional "fair share" that Justice Hall found to be embodied in the constitutional concept of "general welfare." As a constitutional lawyer, I have no quarrel with the New Jersey Supreme Court's analytic use of the general welfare approach, but in accepting it as the basis for explaining the legitimacy of the court's activist stance in political terms to the lay public, Professor Haar inevitably commits himself to an argument that is, again, a bit circular. The New Jersey Constitution does not contain the phrase "fair share," and the phrase "general welfare" is, well, general. It can mean many things to many people, and one can certainly perceive how the average person in the street -particu larly if that person is faced with an unpopular order to rezone in his or her backyard for development that he or she does not welcome -might think that the court interpreted the constitution the way it did in order to be able to pursue, as the modem-day conservative would have it, its liberal agenda.44
This problem of the relationship between judicial legitimacy and the general welfare theory has dogged the Mount Laurel process from the outset. I wrote about it in 1976;45 less friendly critics have heaped scorn on the theory.46 I regret that Professor Haar did not tum his formidable experience and analytic skills more fully to the problem. In saying this, I hope that I am not falling into the cus tomary book-review mode of complaining that the author should have written the book that I think he should have written. Without a more probing inquiry into the condition precedent of a popularly acceptable constitutional theory crying out for enforcement, Profes sor Haar's very valuable analysis of the conditions subsequent that justify judicial activism simply does not persuade those who, unlike me, are not already persuaded.
The uncompleted task of Professor Haar's analysis, therefore, is to inquire whether a reformulation of the underlying constitutional obligation that animates the Mount Laurel doctrine might lay a bet ter, stronger foundation for convincing the fair-minded citizen-in the-street that judicial intervention was both appropriate and neces-44. Application of the general welfare concept is, after all, essentially the doctrine of substantive due process, which has had scant legitimacy even in more sophisticated profes sional circles since the demise of Lochner v. New Yo rk, 198 U.S. 45 {1905). While substantive due process is still encountered fairly often in state courts, the lack of clear standards for its use ought to send state courts the same warning signals about legitimacy as are so clearly sent and received under federal law. [Vol. 96:1685 sary in order to foster a just reordering of society's use of land.47 Without limiting the possibility that other theories might also meet the test of legitimacy as I discuss it here,48 I propose that the theory that cries out for reincorporation into the Mount Laurel doctrine is that of race discrimination.
Race and Exclusionary Zoning
A singular aspect of the first Mount Laurel case is that it totally eschewed race in favor of economic discrimination as the basis for its holding, although there was not much doubt, then or now, that racial concerns play a large part in suburban attitudes toward low income housing. Hindsight suggests that the court may have made the wrong choice, at least insofar as protecting its own legitimacy is concerned. At the time, however, the focus on economic class rather than race seemed quite inspired. The law of race discrimina tion was the law of the Fe deral Equal Protection Clause, and by 1975 law reformers were anxious to keep their cases out of the fed eral courts to avoid the more restrictive rulings of the post-Warren Court era. It was also becoming clear that the U.S. Supreme Court would not prohibit economic discrimination on federal constitu tional grounds,49 and so placing the Mount Laurel doctrine on income-related state constitutional grounds made it virtually im mune to federal court revision. By glossing over race, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court lost the opportunity to draw the clear est of moral lines, and hence to defend the legitimacy of its inter vention on the compelling grounds that Professor Haar urgesnamely, that the state constitution must be enforced, and the court must do it if no other institution will .
I do not wish to be nai'.ve about this. I am not suggesting that by 1975, the people of New Jersey had achieved such a state of beatific colorblindness that we would all have thanked the supreme court for pointing out the racially discriminatory consequences of subur ban exclusionary zoning and immediately complied. There would 47. Recall that Professor Haar, too, criticizes the court for failing to explain its constitu tional theory adequately. See pp. 48-49.
48. I have suggested elsewhere that the shift from passive remedies in Mount Laurel I to "affirm ative" remedies in Mount Laurel II implies that Mount Laurel II is based on an unar ticulated constitutional right to shelter. See J ohn M. Payne, Norman Wi lliams, Ex clusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Making the Th eory Fit the Fa cts, 20 VT. L. RE.v. 665, 683 (1996 ) . Because of its speculative -some might say grandiose -nature, this theory might not survive my reformulation of Professor Haar's defense of judicial legitimacy, although I think my idea can be stated with sufficient clarity and moral force to pass the test. I do not pursue the right to shelter as an alternative theory here, however, because it is not fairly within the scope of Professor Haar's book. In any event, judicial legitimacy is for judges, not law professors; it is our professorial duty to concoct the fanciful ideas out of which legitimate judicial innovation may eventually result, somewhere way down the line, and that is the only appropriate context within which a right to shelter can be discussed.
49. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973 ).
have been a brawl, possibly even a bigger brawl than the one that ensued over the actual terms of Mount Laurel I. But that reaction, in whatever form, would have put the defenders of suburban exclu sionary zoning much more on the defensive than did the actual Mount Laurel case. By 1975, two decades after Brown v. Board of Education,5 0 the legitimacy of judicial enforcement of constitution ally based racial equality was broadly accepted, even if specific judi cial decisions remained controversial. Also by 1975, it had become virtually impossible, except at the extremist fringes, to speak openly the language of racial discrimination, as had been the case in earlier decades. "I'm not a racist, but ... " may still have been a cover for race-conscious thought, but the norm of legitimate public debate re quired at least formal adherence to the principle of nondiscrimina tion that Brown and the civil rights movement had taught us. It would have been difficult to deny the legitimacy of that principle when carried over into a race-based theory of the Mount Laurel doctrine.
From the earliest days of the Mount Laurel doctrine, perceptive commentators have· recognized the perils of a theory that de emphasized race.51 Simply put, there are so many more poor White families than there are poor minority ones that, absent a massive infusion of resources into producing affordable housing that has not happened and realistically could not have happened, it was foresee able that the lion's share of the housing that could be produced would go first, whenever possible, to White households, which, if suspect because of their poverty, were nonetheless not so frighten ing to many middle-class suburbanites as poor Black families. These concerns came to pass. The available data, although far from perfect, reveal that minorities have not benefitted from the Mount Laurel process in anywhere near the proportion that they ought to have in a colorblind world.52
Race: The Warren Township Opinion
The deemphasis on race also leads Professor Haar into one of the rare errors of reportage in Suburbs Un der Siege. He considers at some length the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in In re To wnship of Wa rren,53 in which the court held that the Mount Lau rel doctrine prohibited municipalities from establishing priorities [ Vol. 96:1685 for local -read White -residents in occupying newly available Mount Laurel units. Haar applauds the decision as evidence of the court's continued vigor as an engine for law reform. Insofar as the specific holding is involved, he is correct, but the full story is more complex and not so encouraging. The Wa rren To wnship plaintiffs initially challenged two provi sions in the Warren Township substantive certification and pro posed two separate legal theories to explain how each provision was invalid. The plaintiffs challenged the residency requirement and, in addition, a provision in the township's certified plan permitting it to transfer fifty percent of its Mount Laurel obligation -166 units of housing -to New Brunswick through an RCA.54 They alleged that both provisions violated both the Mount Laurel doctrine and the race discrimination provisions of the Federal Fair Housing Act.55 The challengers lost on both issues and on both theories in the appellate division of superior court, where the case was first heard, and they appealed to the supreme court. Under New Jersey practice, there is an appeal as of right only when there is a dissent in the appellate division, and the dissenting judge in the Wa rren To wn ship case dissented only on the residency issue. The petitioners therefore had to seek leave to appeal as to the RCA provision, which presented the racial issue in its starkest form, as the lower income housing was being transferred from a virtually all-White suburb to an urban municipality with a significant minority popula tion. Because the court had to hear the other branch of the case as of right, and the petitioners had raised the race issue there as well, the petitioners were confident that the justices would hear the en tire case. Not so. The court refused to touch the RCA issue.56 While the court included an extensive -and quite helpful -dic tum about the applicability of Title VIII to Mount Laurel issues in the residency preferences opinion, it expressly declined to hold that the residency preferences violated Title VIII, instead explicitly rest ing the decision only on the Mount Laurel ground.57
The court, in other words, appears to remain deeply ambivalent about the relationship between race, exclusionary zoning, and af fordable housing. The longer I stay in this business, the more con vinced I become that this is a mistake. Housing mobility is one of the keys to reducing race consciousness in our society, because mo bility offers members of minority groups access to the good schools and good jobs that have built the American middle class and be- cause racially integrated neighborhoods force all of us to deal with the race issue as people rather than as stereotypes. Professor Haar's careful analysis of the legitimacy of judicial activism rein forces these convictions of mine, because it convinces me that the morality of a constitutional rule requiring municipalities to exercise their land-use power in a racially fair way would command broad, if sometimes grudging, respect as a legitimate exercise of judicial power. Such a rule therefore would achieve greater and better re sults than has the complex, hard-to-explain Mount Laurel doctrine.
Alas, however, Professor Haar misses the opportunity to make this point to the wide audience his book will command, instead giving the constitutional theory of the Mount Laurel doctrine a more re spectful obedience than it in fact deserves.
I suggest, in other words, that the legitimacy of judicial activism in the Mqunt Laurel cases rests on a slender reed, if that reed is merely the court's interpretation of the general welfare clause of the New Jersey Constitution. Make no mistake about it, it is the popular view of legitimacy that counts for these purp oses, not the exquisitely spun theories of scholars and judges, no matter how convincing those theories may be to other scholars, judges, and pro fessionals, myself included. So I would add a maj or qualification to Professor Haar's exploration of when it is appropriate and neces sary for courts to intervene in matters of social policy. The legiti macy of doing so, I would argue, is related directly to the clarity and precision with which the court can articulate an underlying constitu tional principle that a fairminded person would find obvious. This is not to say that soft constitutional principles, such as the general welfare clause, cannot be enforced or can only be enforced in unag gressive ways. But a court, mindful of its own finite stock of legiti macy, should interfere with political choi9es only in proportion to its confidence that the constitutional mandate is clear and unambig uous. The general welfare approach of the Mount Laurel cases has failed this test. In practice, the fair-share rules are too complicated to be readily understood, too arbitrary and counterintuitive on oc casion to be perceived as fair -the sprawl problem -and, despite their superficial objectivity, too subj ective to be anchored unam biguously in the vague language of the constitution.
Representation and Exclusionary Zoning
There is a way to reformulate the general welfare approach, however, and most of its elements are suggested by Professor Haar's legitimacy analysis. He argues, for example, that one reason why judicial activism is appropriate is that it can stimulate a broad public debate on matters of social policy that might otherwise be ignored if the status quo of entrenched interest groups is allowed to [Vol. 96:1685 govern (p. 177) . He is certainly right about this as a matter of prac tical politics. One of the great achievements of the Mount Laurel cases was that they forced the legislature to consider the conse quences of exclusionary zoning, even though the interest group that benefited -poor people -was relatively powerless and the inter est group that was burdened -suburbanites -was the dominant political voice in statewide politics. As a matter of law, however, and particularly in providing an argument that judicial intervention is appropriate and legitimate, Prof�ssor Haar proves too much. If the source of legitimacy in judicial activism is that the court is en forcing a constitutional norm, then it would seem to follow that the constitutional norm provides the answer, not the starting point, for a new dialogue. If the court is disinterestedly doing what Marbury courts do -resolving disputes in accordance with law -how much leeway is there for the legislature, or various pressure groups, to decide after suitable dialogue not to follow the court's pronounce ment? Not all that much, if judging in constitutional cases is to re main judging and not become the work of a council of revision.
Professor Haar also argues for the necessity of judicial interven tion when political power is territorially dispersed and "[n]o one agency in front of the court, acting alone, has the governmental au thority or ability to clear up the situation created by the multitude of local authorities responsible only to local constituencies" (p. 181). As I noted above, however, it simply is not correct to identify the judiciary as the only statewide institution capable of bringing a regional perspective to bear.58 But if we take these two points and combine them with Professor Haar's further observation that, both before Mount Laurel I and between Mount Laurels I and II, the statewide political system was manifestly disinterested in the prob lem of exclusionary zoning (pp. 177-81), we may then have a way of defending the legitimacy of the court's general welfare approach.
Approached with a view toward making the application of the general welfare concept obvious, as I proposed above, the constitu tional violation that is the essential precondition to Professor Haar's theory of judicial legitimacy is not the failure to provide poor people with a "regional fair share" of housing opportunities, but rather the failure to provide them with a political forum in which they can fairly compete with other interest groups for their "fair share" of society's beneficence. Rather than a "dialogue" be tween the court and the people, as Professor Haar envisions, I sug gest that the court can and should mandate a fairer dialogue among the people themselves, all of them, by mandating a reconsideration of the forum in which the debate takes place. So long as land use power, and hence the power to control the creation of housing af-58. See supra Section: A Theory of J udicial Activism.
fordable to lower-income groups, is delegated to municipalities un conditionally, those municipalities will have not only the power to exclude bun the ability to ignore the voices of those now excluded.
The constitutional right that is implicated in this approach to the problem of exclusionary zoning is the right to have fair participa tion in the political process -the right, as the late Richard Babcock described it, to play "the zoning game"59 on the same playing field as everyone else. The remedy for such a reformulated right is much more straightforward than the substantive implemen tation of "fair share" rules that has preoccupied the Mount Laurel process for the last twenty years. All that is required is that the court order the state to reclaim the delegated zoning power from the gaggle of fragmented, parochial municipalities and either exer cise the power itself, redelegate it to new state or regional planning agencies, or redelegate it to municipalities subject to tighter stan dards that protect the interests of prospective as well as present res idents of the decisionmaking community.60 This is, undoubtedly, a softer remedy than the Mount Laurel fair-share rules, if those rules were fully implemented, but that of course is the point. By building a very aggressive judicial remedy on a hard-to-explain constitu tional base, the supreme court virtually guaranteed that controversy would be maximized and that much of the focus of the controversy would be shifted to the supposed illegitimacy of judicial activism, rather than remaining where it belongs, on the callousness of ignor ing the needs of poor people. The representation theory, by con trast, would justify judicial activism on a ground that fair-minded people could understand and accept -namely, that in a democracy the willin gness to lose a political fight depends on having the chance to win the battle on some other occasion. Under the regime of exclusionary zoning, that could not happen.61
59. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966) . 60. I made this argument to no avail more than twenty years ago. See Payne, supra note 45. The majority opinion in Oakwood at Madison, In c. v. To wnship of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192 Madison, 371 A.2d , 1219 Madison, 371 A.2d n.41 (N.J. 1977 , characterized that argument as "a highly novel idea" but did not suggest fo llowing it. The supreme court also took note of the approach during the briefing that led up to Mount Laurel II, see John M. Payne, Ho using Rights and Remedies: A "Legis lative" History of Mount Laurel II, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 889, 899-900, 931 (1984) , but none of the parties was willin g to embrace it and the court made no mention of it in the subsequent opinion. S. 620 (1996) , striking down a Colorado initiative that effectively denied proponents of gay rights access to conventional political processes, caused barely a ripple of protest. Fair process, it would seem, has independent value in the American system. (Vol. 96:1685 Arguably, the representation approach that I am suggesting can be teased out of the history of the Mount Laurel doctrine. As Pro fessor Haar's narrative describes quite accurately, the ·New Jersey Supreme Court and its three designated trial judges, after the requi site period of Sturm und Drang, convinced the politicians of New Jersey that the Mount Laurel decision would be enforced vigor ously. In the face of judicial orders rezoning specific towns, the leg islature put aside traditional home rule concerns and created a state-level decisionmaking institution, the Council on Affordable Housing, which brings together -imperfectly -municipal and housing advocates to hash out ground rules within which municipal ities must then act in the exercise of their delegated zoning powers, though compliance with the Act is voluntary. As a housing advo cate, I now have a political forum within which to lobby, scheme, and intrigue, just as any other interest group does, with recourse to the cabinet officer who oversees COAH and, on those occasions when the stakes are high enough -usually just before an election -to the office of the governor herself.
But at what cost was this access purchased? Instead of the dec ade of heated debate about the legitimacy of the court's acting at all -a debate the continuing legacy of which is evident in that the phrase "Mount Laurel" still arouses knee-jerk opposition -might it not have been preferable to have attended more carefully to the legitimacy problems up front, fashioning the doctrine to maximize both its legitimacy and its effectiveness? Of course, this is hind sight. Given the choice of repeating the Mount Laurel process as it was or doing nothing at all, I unhesitatingly would cast my vote with Justice Hall and Chief Justice Wilentz and Professor Haar. But we do have the benefit of hindsight, and I would caution the reader understandably swept up in the enthusiasm of Professor Haar's commitment to judicial activism to take his defense of judicial legit imacy as a starting point rather than a roadmap, at least insofar as Mount Laurel is Exhibit A .62
Selling Ju dicial Activism
Finally, let me comment briefly on Professor Haar's third over arching theme, the failure of the New Jersey judiciary to explain adequately its Mount Laurel doctrine to the. public, to convince them of its legitimacy and, correlatively, of the legitimacy of the court itself. While I certainly share Haar's view that the Mo unt 62 . The argument for the legitimacy of judicial enforcement of race-based equality is in dependent of the representation argument made here. The mandate for racial equality has a strong, explicit foundation in the federal and state constitutions and is not subject to a popu lar override to the extent that less explicitly protected interests may be. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969 ) (holding unconstitutional a referendum on open housing Jaw ).
Laurel doctrine was a public relations disaster,63 I disagree with his argument that the court should have waded more vigorously into the world of talk shows and op-ed columns. To be fair to Professor Haar, I do not think that that degree of engagement is what he has in mind. But that in tum is my underlying point, for selling a con troversial issue is an all-or-nothing process. Politics is a tough busi ness, as I learned when I strayed from the classroom and the courtroom to lobby on behalf of affordable housing issues -and specifically in opposition to a constitutional amendment that would have reversed Mount Laurel. A state senator once reprimanded me at a public hearing for having the temerity to oppose his anti-Mount Laurel bill, on the grounds-that as a teacher at the state university, I
worked for the legislature and should therefore obey the boss'sthat is, his -lead. Imagine how judges would fare in even the outer orbits of this world -keeping in mind, as Professor Haar points out, that Chief Justice Wilentz and Justice Pollock both ran into reconfirmation troubles as a result of their participation in the Mount Laurel case.
The problem, ultimately, is the same problem of judicial legiti macy. In order for judges to act boldly, as both Professor Haar and I believe they should, they must convince the public at large that they are acting within the special competence of judges, rather than as unelected -and therefore illegitimate -politicians. Selling their product ultimately connects judges to the political, rather than to the judicial, side of our system of governance and thus undercuts their legitimacy. Hence my preceding argument: reformist, activist judges must place their decisions on clearly understandable and easily ,acceptable bases, such as fair representation or racial equity, so that the decisions sell themselves.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, then, I disagree with Professor Haar's celebration of the role that private litigants can play in structural reform litigation, and I have reservations about the extent to which the Mount Laurel doctrine, as actually formulated and defended, can sustain all of his claims for the legitimacy of judicial activism. The two criticisms, moreover, are related: the perceived self-interest of private builder-litigants undercuts the perceived legitimacy of the entire process, particularly when the absence of public-interest litigants requires the judges to rely extensively on planning masters to gain a balanced picture. 64 When the process no longer looks very much like litigation, doubters are more likely to ask why the decision be- 64. See supra text accompanying note 16.
